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Abstract 
Most empirical research examines how the institutional environment of corruption shapes the behavior of 
MNCs. In this study, we would like to highlight the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNC 
may shape the institutional environment of corruption over time. We propose three avenues through 
which the MNC may have an impact on its host institutions: the regulatory pressure effect, the 
demonstration effect, and the professionalization effect. Based on extensive data on FDI and corruption 
for a large sample of countries over the last 30 years, the empirical results are consistent with our general 
hypothesis that foreign direct investment generates positive spillover effects on the institutional 
environment of host countries. Such findings provide a glimmer of hope for the future of the host country 
where corruption is most prevalent. 
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Introduction 
With the expansion of international business activities, the study of corruption and its effects has 
received increased attention recently. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are careful in choosing host 
countries for their foreign subsidiaries, as they are concerned that pervasive corruption could increase 
their operational costs and risks. So are also multinational banks, since corruption could drain the 
investment funds of a country, hampering its economic growth and debt service capacity. International 
development agencies are concerned that financial aids meant to help economic development and the 
poor may be squandered by corrupt government officials. 
Following Macrae (1982), in this study, we define corruption as an arrangement that involves an 
exchange between two parties (the “demander” and the “supplier”) which i) has an influence on the 
allocation of resources either immediately or in the future; and ii) involves the use or abuse of public or 
collective responsibility for private ends. The harmful effects of corruption have been extensively 
documented in the literature (see, e.g., Mauro (1995, 1997), and Rose-Ackerman (1975)). Corrupt 
payments amount to a significant percentage of gross national product, since the rents extracted by a 
corrupt system gets built into the cost structure of organizations. Corruption distorts efficient resource 
allocation. Corruption rewards unproductive behavior by channeling unmerited contracts and rights to 
companies in exchange for bribes, at the expense of efficient and innovative firms. The toleration of 
corruption in some areas of public life can facilitate a downward spiral in which the malfeasance of some 
encourages more and more people to engage in corruption over time. Pervasive corruption undermines 
the legitimacy of governments. Corruption in the provision of public goods and services in the imposition 
of costs casts a cloud over governments seeking popular legitimacy (Rose-Ackerman (1999)). 
Most empirical work regarding corruption assumes the context where the institutional setting 
shapes the behavior of the MNC. We certainly recognize that, in order to strive for external legitimacy, 
the MNC needs to adapt to its institutional context (Glynn and Abzug (2002)). However, in this study, we 
would like to point out the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNCs could shape the   2
institutional environment of corruption over time. We propose three avenues through which the MNC 
may have an impact on its host institutions: regulatory pressure effect, demonstration effect, and 
professionalization effect.  
The balance of the paper is organized into five sections. Following the introduction, the second 
section II reviews the literature on corruption. The third section III explores how the MNC interacts with 
its host environment and formulates the research hypotheses. In the fourth section, we describe the data 
and methodology used in the paper.  Section V reports the empirical results.  Finally, section VI 
concludes the paper and discusses the implications of our findings. 
II. Literature  review 
As a topic of key concern, the study of corruption has generated numerous published scholarly 
studies. In the academic literature, there are two main streams of studies on the subject. The first stream 
employs the approach of mathematical modeling to analyze the causes, effects and various conditions 
related to corruption. For examples, Rose-Ackerman (1975) examines the relationship between market 
structures and the incidence of corrupt dealings in the government contracting process. She then discusses 
how revising contracting procedures and reorganizing market structures can reduce criminal incentives of 
corruption. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) contend that weak governments that do not control their agencies 
experience high corruption levels. Moreover, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it 
much more distortionary and costly than taxation. 
The second research stream consists of various empirical studies. This line of research is 
facilitated by the publication of worldwide corruption indices by agencies such as the Transparency 
International, World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit and so forth. The corruption indices can be used 
either as an independent or dependent variable. For instance, using corruption as an independent variable, 
studies have found that corruption contributes to suboptimal economic growth (Barro (1996)), poor 
economic competitiveness (Ades and di Tella (1999)), less investment and inefficient government (Knack   3
and Keefer (1995); Mauro (1997)), and a decrease in the level of trust or social capital by citizens (La 
Porta et al. (1997); Knack and Keefer (1997)).  
Using the corruption index as the dependent variable, Husted (1999) finds that corruption is 
significantly associated with GNP per capita and related to the cultural variables power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. Robertson and Watson (2004) find that in the short run, the more 
rapid the rate of change of foreign direct investment (FDI), the higher level of corruption. 
III.  MNCs and corruption in host countries 
MNC as an organization shaped by the host institution 
Empirical studies have been conducted to show how a host country’s corruption significantly 
reduces its inflows of foreign direct investment (Lambsdorff (1999); Mauro (1995); Wei (1997)). Besides 
the volume of FDI inflows, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden (2005) contend that the type of corruption 
in the host country would also affect the choice of entry modes. Using the institutional framework, they 
introduce a two-dimensional framework of corruption: pervasiveness and arbitrariness. They argue that 
the higher the pervasiveness of corruption, the higher is the likelihood that an MNC will choose to enter 
via a wholly owned subsidiary rather than a local partner.  
Most of the studies mentioned above examine how the institutional environment of corruption 
may shape the behavior of MNCs. We certainly recognize that in order to strive for external legitimacy, 
the MNC needs to adapt to its institutional context (Glynn and Abzug (2002)). However, in this study, we 
would like to highlight the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNC may shape the institutional 
environment of corruption over time. We contend that the MNC is not just a passive subject; it may also 
serve an agent of change.   4
MNC as an agent of change to the host institution 
Using the framework of the institutionalization theory, Westney (1993) discusses the potential 
significant impacts of MNCs on the organizational patterns within a country. MNC subsidiaries in some 
countries can play a major role in establishing building blocks of organizations. The introduction of new 
modes of business practice in MNC subsidiaries can challenge the legitimacy of existing patterns and 
stimulate debates on better business practice in the host country. The mirror image of this influence is the 
“de-institutionalization” of local firms’ existing organizational patterns. Similarly, Dacin, Ventresca and 
Beal (1999) review research on organizations to highlight prevailing and emerging conceptions on 
embeddedness. They briefly discuss the concept of “disembeddedness”. They argue that globalization 
may be regarded as a disembedding process that strips individuals and firms from their local structures 
and allows for restructuring at a more global level.  
Following this perspective, we contend that the presence of foreign-owned subsidiaries will, on 
the average, reduce the level of corruption of the host country. We propose that the MNC influences its 
institutional environment over time via three major effects: regulatory pressure effect, demonstration 
effect, and professionalization effect.
1 For better explanation, our main ideas are illustrated in Figure 1. 
This diagram conveys as a general framework on how the MNC may serve as an agent of change for 
host-country institutions. 
Within the host country environment, local governments and the business community influence 
the behavior of foreign-owned subsidiaries. In Figure 1, we use a thick arrow line to represent such 
influence, indicating that such influence tends to be strong and immediate. However, we argue that there 
is a milder force of influence flowing back from the MNC to the host government and business 
                                                 
1   We benefited much from the insights of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who discuss institutional isomorphism. 
Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the 
similar set of environmental conditions. Our proposed three effects correspond with their three mechanisms of 
isomorphism: coercive isomorphism; mimetic isomorphism; and normative isomorphism. However, the focus 
of DiMaggio and Powell is on isomorphism. In order not to confuse readers who are familiar with the 
institutional theory, we use three other terms to represent the effects through which the MNC may shape the 
host country institution over time. 
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community. We use a thin arrow line to represent such influence as it is mild, subtle and takes long time 
to realize. Besides conforming to the local business practice to gain legitimacy, MNCs are also 
accountable to and constrained by their home-country environment and the international business 
community at large. Through the regulatory pressure, demonstration, and professionalization effects, 
MNCs gradually shape the host-country institutions. One motivating factor for the host institutions to 
change is that the host country also wants to gain legitimacy within the bigger, global business 
environment. As the host country grows, it would like to enhance its international reputation and attracts 
more business. Under this general framework of how MNCs may shape host-country institutions over 
time, we study the specific relationship between FDI and host-country corruption.  
Regulatory pressure effect  
In a business culture where corruption is pervasive, corruption becomes the modality of business 
practice in local businesses and government offices. It becomes part of the regular practice and both 
parties of the transaction would take it for granted. However, when a government official deals with a 
foreign entity, he or she may not be able to conduct business as usual. The business people representing 
the MNCs may be reluctant in offering a bribe. Firstly, the subsidiary of an MNC is faced with two sets 
of isomorphic pressures --- the MNC’s and the host country’s (Davis et al. (2000); Kostova and Roth 
(2002)).  Besides trying to gain external legitimacy by adopting the common corrupt business practice of 
the host country, it also has to strive for internal legitimacy as the headquarter in the home-country 
environment may have adopted norms and practices that ban corrupt behaviors by their subsidiaries.  
Secondly, there is the regulatory pressure from the home government and the international 
business community (DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Oliver (1997)). For instance, the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, enacted in 1977, was prompted by a series of scandals involving questionable 
payments by U.S. firms to overseas government officials. This act prohibits U.S. firms from giving 
anything of value (such as a payment, gift or bribe) to induce a foreign government to enter into a 
contract or business advantage or relationship. This act carries criminal penalties, imprisonment for up to 
five years, fines of up to $100,000 for individuals, and fines up to $2 million for companies.   6
Similar legislation is enacted in the global business community. On November 21, 1997, 
representatives from 33 countries signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions. Among them were 28 of the 29 member states of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), together with Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Chile, and the Solvak Republic (Doh et al., 2003). 
Under regulatory pressure from home country and the international business community, the 
employees of MNC’s subsidiaries are reluctant to offer bribes. If the MNC has enough bargaining power 
and its presence is much desired by the host government, it may simply refuse offering bribes. Even if the 
subsidiary employees think that they need to engage in bribery in order to secure business, the local 
officials may need to think of some circuitous ways to accept the bribes so that the MNC employees are 
less likely to get caught. Facing a foreign business party, the local government officials are constrained 
somewhat in their bribery acts. It cannot be just business as usual. 
Demonstration effect 
In the international business literature, there is a line of research that studies spillover effects of 
foreign direct investment (Globerman (1979), Haddad and Harrison (1993), Eden et al. (1997), Aitken 
and Harrison (1999), and Liu et al. (2000)). The discussion of the spillover effects concentrates mainly on 
productivity and technological transfer. For instance, Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Gorg and Strobl 
(2001) summarize how FDI may affect the productivity of domestic firms. First, competition from FDI 
may force domestic firms to update production technology and change management styles in order to 
maintain their competitiveness. Second, domestic firms may learn from observing the MNCs’ practice 
when there are close relationships between them. Thirdly, MNCs train their employees who may later 
move to domestic firms with learnt skills. 
Following this line of thought, we argue that there may also be a spillover or demonstration effect 
on corruption (Oliver (1997)). In some host countries, corruption has been immersed deep in the local 
business culture. Local business people and government officials may think that this is the “normal” way 
to get business done. However, when they deal with the MNCs through negotiations, joint ventures,   7
upstream or downstream relationships in the business chains, being geographically and operationally 
proximate, they have opportunities to observe closely how business decisions and allocations are made 
within the MNCs (Eden et al. (1997)). Business can be conducted more efficiently in an environment 
built on trust and ethical conduct. In the past, local advocates might also “talk” about ethical business 
practice but might not produce a concrete, real example to follow. The presence of MNCs demonstrates 
how a cleaner way of conducting business can be more effective and efficient in the long run. 
Furthermore, outward-looking local business people and government officials also want to gain 
legitimacy within the global business community. They want to enhance the country’s international 
reputation and to attract more business. They may model themselves after the MNCs and change their 
traditional business practices gradually. 
Professionalization effect 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discuss two important aspects of professionalization. One is the 
resting of formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists. The 
other is the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which 
new models diffuse rapidly.  
MNCs have been in the forefront of the application of automation, information technology and 
managerial techniques in order to enhance business efficiency. Alternatively, academicians strive to 
improve business knowledge and develop practical applications by conducting theoretical and empirical 
research. All areas of business have, to one degree or another, become sciences. Academic curricula have 
become increasingly standardized and professionalized. Business schools around the world tend to adopt 
textbooks and course contents from the same pool of leading authors and universities. In order to excel 
above their peers, managers want to acquire professional business training. Afraid of being left out by 
competitors, even family-owned businesses consider sending their “heirs” to business schools (Ramirez 
and Kwok (2006)). 
To the younger generation, the MNCs have special appeal. MNCs usually offer substantially 
better salaries than domestic companies in host countries. Not only is working for MNCs prestigious, they   8
can be exposed to sophisticated management practices, which will equip them with skills for a successful 
business career in the long run. Furthermore, they may be given opportunities to go overseas for short-
term training or business assignments.  
To enhance their chance of being recruited by MNCs, the young generation needs to learn about 
global business practices. They attend schools to acquire professional business training. To certify their 
qualifications, they may take public examinations and join professional associations. Such professional 
organizations may set industry-wide ethical codes of conduct, product quality standards, uniform training 
or credentialing in occupational professions (Oliver (1997)). Socialized by the professional business 
values, they become increasingly critical of the traditional ways. As the “new blood” rise in the corporate 
ladder, they become business leaders. They may work for the MNC, they may have started their own 
business, or they may have become senior advisors to government officials. They may use their influence 
to gradually reform the more corrupt old business practices. In short, the professionalization of the 
management practice and the socialization of the younger generation lead to the changes in the host 
country institutions over time. 
Through the three effects mentioned above, we contend that the presence of MNCs may help 
reduce corruption in the host country over time. We put forward the following research hypothesis: 
H1:   The level of foreign direct investment in a host country is negatively related to its level of 
corruption over time.
 2 
However, we need to add quickly that it would be naïve to think that the influence of MNCs on 
its environmental institution is always good. There are plenty of anecdotal evidences that MNCs 
sometimes bring undesirable influences. In some situations, MNCs exploit natural resources, cause 
environmental pollution, employ child labor, or take advantage of the looser regulations of the host 
countries (to bypass the stringent regulations and costly requirements of parent countries). In fact, 
                                                 
2   Our hypothesis is on an average effect. First, some MNCs may still engage in corrupt transactions to facilitate 
their operation. Second, there are also foreign direct investment flows among developed countries where both 
the home and host countries do not experience a high level of corruption. In that case, the corruption-reduction 
effect may be minimal. To examine this latter point, in our robustness tests, we exclude OECD countries from 
our sample of host countries. The findings are generally robust. Owing to space constraint, the tables of these 
additional findings are not included in this paper but will be made available to readers upon request.   9
Robertson and Watson (2004) argue that foreign direct investment will lead to an increase of corruption 
in the host country in the short run. Firstly, the increase in FDI represents a larger amount of foreign 
money flowing into country and, therefore, an expansion of opportunities for bribery. Secondly, the 
eagerness of foreign investors to enter the market may tempt host country nationals to resort to corruption 
as a means of sharing in the opportunities for profit presented by their own country (Robertson and 
Watson (2004)).
3 Thirdly, equipped with advanced knowledge in international business and a vast 
international network, MNCs may have developed sophisticated skills of bribery. Such practices will 
“contaminate” firms in the host country. To represent this opposite view, we put forward the following 
alternative hypothesis: 
H1a:   The level of foreign direct investment in a host country is positively related to its level of 
corruption over time. 
IV.  Data and research methodology  
 
We attempt to explain the cross-country variations in the extent of corruption based on variations 
in the degree of past foreign investment penetration in the economy and other known controls.  To that 
end, we construct a database composed of three sets of data: (1) measures of corruption in the 2000s (the 
dependent variable); (2) measures of MNC presence or foreign direct investment, education, and culture 
(the independent variables); and (3) other controls.  We have data on these sets of variables for up to 140 
countries.  
The dependent variable: corruption 
Our dependent variable is the extent of corruption in recent years, and is measured by the average 
of yearly corruption perception indices over the period 2000 through 2004 obtained from Transparency 
International (TI).  The TI Corruption Perception Index provides yearly ranking of countries in terms of 
the extent of perceived corruption among, primarily, public officials. The index is a composite measure 
                                                 
3   Robertson and Watson (2004) find empirical support for their hypothesis. They use a 1- and 2-year lag-time 
between the predictor variable (FDI) and the dependent variable (corruption). Their result reflects more on the 
short-term effect. On the other hand, the focus of this paper is on the long-term effect of FDI on corruption as 
the suggested three effects take time to realize. 
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based on polls and surveys of business leaders, residents and country analysts on their experience of 
corruption in the respective countries drawn from seven different independent institutions.
4 Table 1 
reports the summary statistics of the variables while Table 2 shows their correlation coefficients. There is 
a wide cross-country variation in the corruption index, ranging from 0.22 in Finland and 0.44 in Denmark 
to 8.9 in Bangladesh and 8.66 in Nigeria. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Husted (1999)), 
wealthier countries tend to be less corrupt. The corruption perception index is significantly negatively 
correlated with log of per capita GDP. 
The main independent variable: FDI 
  We measure the presence of MNCs in a host country by the average net Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows as a percentage of GDP. We attempt to explain variations in corruption in the 
2000s based on the degree of foreign investment penetration in the past.  We expect a significant time lag 
for the effects to realize but we do not know how far in the past the FDI should be in explaining current 
variations in corruption. Nonetheless, we have available data on FDI inflows from 1970 through 1997. 
Thus, we consider decade averages of FDI per GDP in the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s, as well as an 
average over the period 1970 through 1997 respectively. The data on FDI inflows and GDP is obtained 
from the World Development Database maintained by the World Bank.   
Table 1 provides a summary of the decade averages of FDI to GDP ratios for the sample. The 
flow of FDI shows an increasing trend, the average growing from 0.93 percent of GDP in 1970s to 1.089 
percent in the 1980s and 2.128 percent in the 90s.  In general, high level of FDI appears to be associated 
with low corruption in the 2000s. The correlation coefficients between FDI and corruption are mostly 
negative and significant (see Table 2).   
                                                 
4   The corruption perception index is a continuous scale variable, taking values from 0 to 10. The higher the value, 
the less corrupt the country is.  To make the scaling more intuitive, we rescale the corruption perception index 
by deducting it from 10, so that a 0 on the new scale signifies a corruption-free country and a 10 represents an 
absolutely corrupt country.   11
V. Empirical  findings 
FDI and corruption 
 
  To explore the relations between corruption and the extent of past FDI while controlling for other 
potential country factors, we estimate multivariate empirical models. Table 3 presents the main results of 
the multivariate regression of corruption on FDI, controlling for a host of control variables.  The model is 
of the form:  
  c C
i n
i
i or s s s
C C Z FDI CORRUPTION ε λ β α + + + = ∑ =
−
1
1997 1970 , 90 , 80 , 70 *  ,  (1) 
where FDI is the FDI inflows as a fraction of GDP, and Z is a set of country-specific control variables 
representing the macro-economic, political, legal, religious orientation and institutional environments of 
countries that potentially explain the cross-country variations in corruption. FDIC will alternatively take 
the values of decade averages of FDI in 1970s, in 1980s, in 1990s and the average FDI to GDP ratio over 
1970 through 1997, whereas CORRUPTION will take the average per country of the yearly Corruption 
Perception Index averaged over the period 2000 through 2004. 
Table 3 clearly shows that past FDI inflows explains a significant portion of the cross-country 
variations in corruption. Columns I through IV include the decade averages of FDI to GDP ratios in 
combination with the level of GDP per capita as a measure of wealth in the regression.  The results show 
that the prevalence of corruption today is, on average, lower in countries with larger foreign direct 
investment in the past, regardless of how far back we measure the FDI. The coefficients on the key 
variables of interest, FDI in 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 1970 through 1997, are robustly negative and 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. The result is broadly consistent with and suggestive of 
our hypothesis. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Husted (1999) and Mauro (1995)), wealthier 
countries have less prevalence of corruption. In general the model works well; in this large sample of 87 
to 100 countries, the model explains up to 79 percent of the cross-country variation in the prevalence of 
current corruption.  To strengthen the veracity of the findings, we control for other variables suggested in   12
the literature, which may also influence a country’s propensity to corruption. We group these controls 
into three categories: 1) Education/Human Capital; 2) Political Tradition; and 3) Legal Environments. 
Control for education/human capital 
The benefits of education as an institution to economic welfare have been well documented.  
Education explains cross-country differences in economic growth across countries (see, e.g., Barro 
(1991). Education opens up peoples’ eyes to new ways of thinking and practice, and is a source of 
increased productivity, efficiency and growth.  The development of a critical mass of educated class 
would have the potential to change the old ways of life, including corruption. In some way, the effects of 
education are similar to those of FDI; much of the benefits are not immediate. To control for the impacts 
of education, we include decade averages of secondary school enrollment (as a percentage of eligible 
population of the age group) from the World Development database. Columns (V) through (VIII) of 
Table 3 show that the effect of educational investment on corruption is similar, though weak, as that of 
FDI.   
Control for political tradition 
The political tradition of the country has a significant impact on its institutional environment.  
Governments differ in their role as facilitators of institutional change, and the effect they have on 
business practices (see, e.g., Rao et al. (2005)).  Autocratic political cultures that lack transparency where 
political actors are prone to undermine the rule of law tend to be a breeding ground for abuse of public 
office, including corruption.  In contrast, open societies with democratic political culture and appropriate 
checks and balances in place for constraining actions of political actors are less prone to such abuse. To 
control for the effects of political traditions, we use two variables: a measure of the extent of democratic 
political system in the country (Jaggers and Marshall (2000)) and a measure of constraints on political 
actors in the system (Henisz (2000)). The two variables have significant correlation. To reduce the 
possibility of multicollinearity from inclusion of both in the same regression, we orthogonalize the 
democracy variable on political constraint and include only the residual value of political constraint.  
Columns IX through XII report that the marginal effect of political traditions is not as significant, once   13
one controls for wealth, FDI and education.  More democratic countries tend to be less corrupt on 
average, though the result is weak and is not sustainable in all specifications.  
Control for legal environment 
A weak legal system where basic rule of law is lacking would be permissive of abuse of public 
office through its failure of legally constraining those in power.  In addition, even in the presence of basic 
rule of law, the substantive and procedural contents of the law could be a source of variation in the 
efficiency of the legal system.  Legal systems that are cumbersome in procedural formalism and short of 
the legal flexibility that are needed for judicial actions tend to increase the costs of legal proceedings, 
prompting the public to seek extra-judicial means of resolution, including corruption. We include the 
‘rule of law’ and the ‘legal formalism’ variables developed by Djankov et al. (2003) in our regressions. 
Consistent with our conjecture, columns (XIII) through (XV) show that countries with the prevalence of 
rule of law tend to be less prone to corruption.  Legal systems that are more formal and less flexible 
appear to be associated with higher corruption. 
As seen in the regression results in Table 3, our main finding that increased past FDI reduced the 
prevalence of current corruption is robust to the inclusion of controls for the legal environment, political 
tradition, education and economic development.
5 The findings are broadly consistent with our main 
hypothesis H1 and not supportive of the alternative hypothesis H1a. We argue earlier that the MNC 
influences its institutional environment over time via three major effects: regulatory pressure effect, 
demonstration effect, and professionalization effect. While it is difficult to provide precise, direct tests of 
                                                 
5   To check for other institutional control variables, instead of the political and legal variables, we also used a 
variable that denotes the religious orientation of the country – the percentage of population that follow 
Protestantism.  Religion appears to be a dominant influence on the institutional environment of countries, 
showing significant correlation with our legal and political variables. Our results are robust to such 
specification, showing that countries with past FDI exhibit lower rate of corruption, after controlling for 
religion. The coefficient on FDI is -0.385, significant at 1 percent level. Also countries with dominant 
protestant influence display lower incidence of corruption.  In addition, we considered a much broader measure 
of institutional development (instead of the political and legal variables we have) from Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
This measure reflects the institutional quality, based on measures of voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, law and order, and freedom from graft. 
The results show robust negative relation between FDI and corruption.  The coefficient estimate is -0.139 which 
is significant at 10 percent level. The results using religious orientation or institutional development as controls 
are not reported in the tables owing to page constraint. They will be made available to readers upon request.   14
these three effects, we attempt to shed more light on these avenues of influence by examining the 
moderating role of past FDI on the known effects of two variables on corruption: Culture and Education.   
Culture, education and corruption: the moderating effects of FDI 
In this section, we interact the FDI variable with two sets of variables, Culture and Education. 
The objectives of this exercise are twofold. First, evidence that FDI presence moderates the negative 
effects of culture, or it strengthens the positive effects of education on corruption would be suggestive of 
the effects of FDI in play. Second, examining interaction (rather than direct) effects also addresses the 
potential endogeneity problem we are cognizant of.  In the previous section, we regress corruption in 
2000s on lagged values of FDI, the lagged values going as far back as 30 years.  The fact that the FDI 
values are not contemporaneous with the corruption data minimizes the concerns on reverse causality.  
However, it can be argued that past FDI is made in anticipation of the institutional environment in the 
future so much so that prediction of low corruption in the future attracts more FDI today.  One effective 
way of addressing such endogeneity is to focus on the marginal effect of FDI on the effect of a known 
variable, such as culture, on corruption. The literature indicates that some cultures, as country effects, 
breed in corruption. We find earlier that education as a social investment deters corruption.  If we find 
that marginally, the known negative effects of culture is moderated and the known positive effects of 
education is strengthened by the presence of FDI, then we can say that we have a clearer indicator of 
causality running from FDI to corruption. 
Using Hofstede’s measures of national culture, Husted (1999) identifies power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity to have significant impact on national corruption. Kimbro (2002) 
reports power distance and individualism as related to corruption after controlling for legal and 
monitoring variables the way we do.  It appears that the consensus is that individualism and power 
distance are the cultural traits that are associated with corruption; collectivistic cultures and cultures with 
high power distance gravitate towards high prevalence of corruption. If FDI has the catalyst role through 
the three effects, it would moderate the harmful effects of culture on corruption.   15
Columns (I) through (IV) of Table 4 examine the interaction between power distance and FDI. 
The results show that, consistent with previous research (see, for examples, Husted (1999), Triandis et al. 
(2001)), high power-distance countries tend to have high prevalence of corruption. More significantly, the 
effect of high power-distance on corruption is significantly lower in the presence of FDI; the interaction 
terms between FDI and power-distance are robustly negative and statistically significant at the one per 
cent level. Columns (V) through (VIII) provide similar results on the interaction of 
individualism/collectivism and FDI. Though the coefficient is positive, individualism has no discernible 
direct effect on incidence of corruption. This is consistent with existing, though ambiguous, evidence 
about individualism in the literature. For example, Husted (1999) finds no direct effect from 
individualism to corruption, while Kimbro (2002) finds direct effects, once the effect of countries’ wealth 
is controlled for. More importantly, the effects of individualism/collectivism on corruption are 
significantly lower in the presence of FDI.
6 
Our analysis in the previous section reveals that one of the critical variables that explain the 
variations in the prevalence of corruption is education. It can be argued that, via the professionalization 
effect, FDI presence complements education in transforming the institutional environment of countries. 
Columns (IX) through (XI) report the results. For education we use the average yearly secondary school 
enrollment, averaged over 1970 though 2000.
7 The use of decade averages over 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
does not change the results. Consistent with our earlier results, education has positive, though moderate, 
direct effects on corruption. The coefficients on the education variable are negative and significant at ten 
per cent level.  Consistent with our conjecture, the positive effects of education on corruption are 
significantly larger in the presence of FDI; the interaction terms between education and FDI are robustly 
negative and statistically significant as one per cent level. The models in Table 4 perform well, explaining 
                                                 
6   For reasons outlined earlier, we focus on the power distance and individualism attributes of national culture.  
Though not reported for brevity, the results using the other two attributes, masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance, provide qualitatively similar evidence. Again for brevity, we use the overall average FDI over the 
entire period of 1970 through 1997 as the FDI variable. However, the results are robust when we use the decade 
averages instead. 
7   Secondary school enrollment is a standard measure of human capital in the literature of economic growth (e.g. 
Barro (1991)).   16
more than 80 percent of the cross-country variations in corruption, though our sample has significantly 
shrunk because of missing values. 
Robustness tests 
 
Using alternative measures for the independent variable 
 
  We provide additional sensitivity checks in this section. First, instead of using the actual values 
of FDI as independent variable, we include group indicator of high or low FDI countries in the regression.  
We group the countries into three categories based on their rankings of FDI flows, and designate the 
bottom-third countries as low-FDI countries with a dummy variable value of 0, and the top-third 
countries as high-FDI countries with a dummy variable value of 1. Columns (I) through (IV) of Table 5 
show that our main findings are robust to the alternative measure of FDI. For brevity, we report the 
results using the FDI and Education variables generated based on averages over the period 1970 through 
1997. The results are similar if we use values based on decade averages in 1970s, 1980s or 1990s. 
Instrumental variables methodology 
Our findings are based on regressing corruption in 2000s on lagged values of FDI, the lagged 
values going as far back as 30 years. The fact that the FDI values are not contemporaneous with the 
corruption data minimizes the concerns one may have about the possibility of reverse causality.   
However, it could still be argued that past FDI is made based on predictions about the institutional 
environment in the future such that a forecast of low corruption in the future attracts more FDI today. The 
robust findings on the channels through which past FDI moderates the harmful effects of culture and 
strengthens the beneficial effects of education, shown in the previous section, go a long way in allaying 
our concerns on reverse causality.  
An alternative approach to address the endogeneity issue would be to use instruments that 
disentangle the link between FDI and corruption. We estimate the basic models using the instrumental 
variables methodology, where we attempt to relate the exogenous component of FDI to corruption. The 
ideal instruments are variables that might affect corruption but less likely to be affected by it. The most   17
difficult task in this setting, however, is the identification of appropriate instruments. It is customary in 
the finance and economics literature to use such institutional variables as legal origin or colonial history. 
These variables however, are not useful for our case, as both corruption and FDI are driven by the 
institutional environment. We look for variables that explain FDI but less likely to be related with 
corruption. The literature provides a menu of FDI determinants, but most variables are institutional.  In 
addition to variables related to the host country investment climate, FDI is facilitated by better 
infrastructure including communication networks and supply of power.  We use two variables of this 
nature as instruments: (a) per capita electricity power consumption, and (b) telephone lines (per 1,000 
people). We examine the effects of the exogenous component of FDI (the component explainable by our 
instruments) on corruption.  Columns (V) through (VIII) of Table 5 present the instrumental variables 
(IV) results. Column (V) confirm the major findings from Table 4 that corruption is lower in countries 
with high past FDI predicted by the instruments. Columns (VI) through (VIII) confirm the main results 
that FDI moderates the harmful effects of culture and strengthens the positive effects of education.
8  
Change in corruption as a dependent variable 
  To address the concern on causality further, we also examine the relation between past FDI and 
changes (rather than levels) in the corruption measures.  Based on the data, we compute the difference 
between the average corruption level over 2000 through 2004 and the average corruption index between 
1995 and 1999, and examine whether the change in the index levels is related to past FDI flows as 
hypothesized.  The results, shown in Table 6, confirm the main results so far.  The change in corruption is 
inversely related to past FDI.  In addition, FDI appears to moderate the harmful effects of culture and 
                                                 
8   We follow a two-step procedure where we predict the level of FDI using our two instruments in the first step, 
and use the predicted FDI values and other predetermined variables to explain variations in corruption.  The test 
for the validity of the instruments using GMM estimation does not support the hypothesis.  However, in this 
test, the set of instruments include both the two instrumental variables we specified and the six exogenous 
explanatory variables in the model; since, with only two instruments, the model will be under-identified.   
Nevertheless, this result reflects the difficulty of finding good instruments in our context and suggests that the 
readers should interpret our instrumental variables results with this limitation in mind.   18
strengthens the positive effects of education, as the interaction terms between past FDI and our proxies of 
culture and education are significantly negative.
9 
VI.  Summary and conclusions 
Most empirical research so far examines how the institutional environment of corruption shapes 
the behavior of MNCs. In this study, we highlight the other side of the picture: how the presence of MNC 
may shape the institutional environment of corruption over time. We recognize that, in order to strive for 
external legitimacy, the MNC needs to adapt to its institutional context. Most FDI represents flows from 
developed countries, where there is generally less corruption. The behavior of MNC in host country is 
constrained by the regulatory pressure from home country and the international business community (e.g. 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions). In dealing with a foreign business party, the local 
government officials are constrained somewhat in their bribery acts; it cannot be just business as usual. 
Over time, together with the demonstration and the professionalization effects, local government officials 
and business people may model themselves after the MNCs and modify their traditional business 
practices. They may want to enhance legitimacy within the global business community, raise the 
country’s international reputation, and attract more business into their country. 
We empirically examine our propositions based on an extensive data on FDI and corruption 
around the world, for a large sample of countries, over the last 30 years. First, consistent with our thesis, 
we find that current corruption level is significantly lower in countries with high FDI flows in the past. 
This is true whether we use FDI in 1970s, 1980s or 1990s.  Second, we find strong evidence that the 
harmful effects of culture on corruption are lower and the beneficial effects of education on corruption are 
higher in countries with higher FDI in the past.  Our results are robust to omitted variables bias as we 
                                                 
9   In this study, we do not use the change of corruption level as our main dependent variable. Transparency 
International computes the Corruption Perception Index as a composite of a number of independent surveys. As 
explained in Robertson and Watson (2004, p. 390), the sources used differ from year to year. Hence, the CPI is 
suitable for cross-sectional comparisons but unsuitable for longitudinal comparisons. To alleviate the concern 
of varying sources over time, we use the average corruption levels of two broad periods to compute the 
difference. Nevertheless, the readers should interpret the findings with such limitation in mind.    19
control for a host of host-country characteristics, including the level of economic development, political 
tradition, education, culture, legal system, religious orientation and institutional development. 
We use multiple ways to alleviate the potential concerns of reverse causality. Firstly, we regress 
corruption in 2000s on lagged values of FDI, the lagged values going as far back as 30 years. Secondly, 
we explore the interaction effects between FDI and variables such as culture and education. Thirdly, we 
employ the instrumental variables methodology, using two instrumental variables, communication 
network and supply of power, to relate the exogenous component of FDI to corruption. Fourthly, we 
regress changes (rather than levels) in the corruption measures on past FDI. The robust results give us 
confidence that there is a causal effect flowing from FDI to corruption. 
Our findings confirm the fruitfulness of studying the potential impact of MNCs on the 
organizational patterns within a country. As contended by Westney (1993), MNC subsidiaries in some 
countries can play a major role in establishing building blocks of organizations. The introduction of new 
modes of business practice in MNC subsidiaries can challenge the legitimacy of existing patterns and 
stimulate debates on better business practices, initiating a “de-institutionalization” process. 
Certainly, it would be naïve to think that the influence of MNCs on its institutional environment 
is always good. There are plenty of anecdotal evidences that MNCs sometimes bring in undesirable 
influences. However, in the area of corruption, our empirical findings show that the average effect is 
positive: the presence of FDI could help reduce the corruption level of a host country over time. It enables 
the MNC to point out to the host government and its people another potential benefit of opening its doors 
to foreign direct investment. Such a dynamic perspective provides a glimmer of hope to host countries 
where corruption is widely prevalent.   20
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Figure 1: MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
Mean Std  Dev  Minimum Maximum  N 
Dependent Variables: 
 
      Corruption 2000-04 
 
 
5.634 
 
 
 
2.313 
 
 
0.220 
 
 
8.900 
 
 
120 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
     FDI to GDP in 1970s 
     FDI to GDP in 1980s 
     FDI to GDP in 1990s 
     FDI to GDP 1970-1997 
 
 
0.933 
  1.089 
  2.128 
  1.488 
 
 
1.318 
2.089 
4.057 
2.204 
 
 
-1.844 
-4.206 
-11.028 
-4.365 
 
 
 
5.838 
14.838 
37.284 
14.191 
 
 
113 
136 
140 
142 
Control Variables: 
    
      Per Capita GDP 
 
 
8.291 
 
 
1.123 
 
 
6.064 
 
 
10.164 
 
 
133 
      Education in 1970s  36.846  27.741  1.000  94.667  128 
      Education in 1980s  47.376  30.237  3.460  107.679  131 
      Education in 1990s  55.001  33.795  5.257  129.966  130 
      Education in 1970-1997  44.408  29.482  1.171  104.442  143 
      Democracy  5.051  3.775  0  10.000  85 
      Political Constraint  0.348  0.324  0  0.893  133 
      Rule of Law  6.907  2.445  1.670  10.000  76 
      Legal Formalism  3.549  1.015  1.414  5.907  94 
      Culture 
          Power Distance 
 
56.41 
 
21.48 
 
11.00 
 
104.00 
 
56 
          Individualism/Collectivism  43.50  25.20  6.00  91.00  56 
Instrumental Variables:   
       Telephone Lines 
 
85.85 
 
123.44 
 
0.65 
 
594.81 
 
134 
       Electricity Consumption  
(kwh per capita) 
7.2E10 2.8E11  2.6E7  2.7E12  104   25
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (figures in parentheses are p values) 
  Corruption Per  capita 
GDP 
FDI in 
1970s 
FDI in 
1980s 
FDI in 
1990s 
FDI 
1970-
1997 
Education 
in 1970s 
Education 
in 1980s 
Education 
in 1990s 
Education 
in 1970-
1997 
Power 
Distance 
Individualism 
Collectivism 
Democracy Political 
Constraint 
Per Capita GDP  -0.835 
(0.0001) 
                     
FDI in 1970s  -0.1154 
(0.141) 
0.125 
(0.207) 
                   
FDI in 1980s  -0.285 
(0.003) 
0.208 
(0.022) 
0.464 
(<.0001) 
                 
FDI in 1990s  -0.174 
(0.076) 
0.109 
(0.223) 
0.078 
(0.409) 
0.419 
(<.0001) 
                 
FDI in 1970-1997  -0.208 
(0.032) 
0.119 
(0.180) 
0.405 
(<.0001) 
0.761 
(<.0001) 
0.867 
(<.0001) 
               
Education in 1970s  -0.771 
(0.0001) 
0.889 
(<.0001) 
0.086 
(0.386) 
0.088 
(0.343) 
0.019 
(0.839) 
0.022 
(0.817) 
            
Education in 1980s  -0.745 
(0.0001) 
0.834 
(<.0001) 
0.775 
(<.0001) 
0.054 
(0.557) 
0.108 
(0.233) 
0.069 
(0.439) 
0.954 
(<.0001) 
           
Education in in 1990s  -0.799 
(0.0001) 
0.881 
(<.0001) 
0.089 
(0.371) 
0.087 
(0.347) 
0.079 
(0.388) 
0.027 
(0.766) 
0.923 
(<.0001) 
0.951 
(<.0001) 
         
Education in 1970-
1997 
-0.746 
(0.0001) 
0.824 
(<.0001) 
0.120 
(0.208) 
0.091 
(0.303) 
 
-0.026 
(0.762) 
 
-0.019 
(0.818) 
0.964 
(<.0001) 
0.989 
(<.0001) 
0.975 
(<.0001) 
        
Power Distance  0.682 
(<.0001) 
-0.616 
(<.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.984) 
-0.018 
(0.904) 
-0.043 
(0.765) 
-0.004 
(0.977) 
-0.594 
(<.0001) 
-0.618 
(<.0001) 
-0.627 
(<.0001) 
-0.591 
 (<.0001) 
     
Individualism/Collect
ivism 
-0.702 
(<.0001) 
0.742 
(<.0001) 
-0.122 
(0.418) 
-0.030 
(0.833) 
-0.151 
(0.295) 
-0.136 
(0.344) 
0.686 
(<.0001) 
0.666 
(<.0001) 
0.749 
(<.0001) 
0.669 
(<.0001) 
-0.647 
(<.0001) 
    
Democracy  -0.686 
(<.0001) 
0.689 
(<.0001) 
0.104 
(0.366) 
0.061 
(0.585) 
0.071 
(0.528) 
0.091 
(0.413) 
0.709 
(<.0001) 
0.673 
(<.0001) 
0.737 
(<.0001) 
0.704 
 (<.0001) 
-0.688 
(<.0001) 
0.721 
(<.0001) 
  
Political Constraint  -0.607 
(<.0001) 
0.579 
(<.0001) 
0.103 
(0.315) 
0.075 
(0.429) 
-0.026 
(0.776) 
-0.018 
(0.840) 
0.648 
(<.0001) 
0.596 
(<.0001) 
0.611 
(<.0001) 
0.610 
(<.0001) 
-0.449 
(<.0001) 
0.533 
(<.0001) 
0.825 
(<.0001) 
 
Rule of Law  -0.801 
(<.0001) 
0.703 
(<.0001) 
0.050 
(0.694) 
0.175 
(0.151) 
0.074 
(0.542) 
0.120 
(0.322) 
0.632 
(<.0001) 
0.571 
(<.0001) 
0.608 
(<.0001) 
0.583 
(<.0001) 
-0.645 
(<.0001) 
0.693 
(<.0001) 
0.524 
(<.0001) 
0.420 
(<.0001) 
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Table 3:  FDI and Corruption 
 
  I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV 
F D I                  
    FDI in 1970s  -0.191
b 
(0.095) 
    -0.169
c 
(0.092) 
    -0.186
 
(0.117) 
      
    FDI in 1980s 
  -0.289
a 
(0.088) 
  
  -0.313
a 
(0.086) 
  
  -0.359
a 
(0.092) 
   -0.322
a 
(0.092) 
  
    FDI in 1990s      -0.206
a 
(0.066) 
    -0.197
a 
(0.064) 
    -0.198
b 
(0.019) 
   -0.162
b 
(0.076) 
 
    FDI in 70-1997        -0.281
a 
(0.088) 
    -0.269
a 
(0.085) 
    -0.327
a 
(0.103) 
   -0.263
b 
(0.102) 
Education  
              
   Education in 1970s     
   -0.016
b 
(0.008) 
 
   -0.0.13
 
(0.011) 
   
    
   Education in 1980s            -0.013
b 
(0.006) 
 
   -0.014
c 
(0.008) 
   -0.023
b 
(0.009) 
  
      Education  in  1990s         -0.016
b 
(0.006) 
    -0.019
b 
(0.008) 
 
  -0.025
a 
(0.008) 
 
   Education in 70- 
1997 
      
  -0.015
a 
(0.006)
 
   -0.016
b 
(0.008) 
   -0.019
b 
(0.008) 
Political Tradition   
              
   Democracy   
        -0.091 
(0.071) 
-0.149
b 
(0.063) 
-0.107 
(0.065)
 
-0.117
c 
(0.064) 
-0.066 
(0.051) 
-0.003 
(0.054) 
-0.035 
(0.050) 
   Political Constraint   
        0.798 
(0.759)
 
0.619 
(0.703) 
0.788 
(0.718) 
0.719 
(0.708)
 
0.305 
(0.777) 
0.426 
(0.779) 
0.341 
(0.786) 
L e g a l   E n v i r o n m e n t                    
        R u l e   o f   L a w          
       - 0 . 2 8 1
a 
(0.094) 
-0.273
a 
(0.088) 
-0.276
a 
(0.089) 
    Legal Formalism   
        
    0.285
b 
(0.094) 
0.323
b 
(0.133) 
0.302
b 
(0.137) 
  GDP per Capita  -0.0004
a 
(2E-5) 
-0.0004
a 
(2E-4) 
-0.0004
a 
(2E-4) 
-0.0004
a 
(2E-4) 
-0.0004
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0004
a 
(4E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(4E-5) 
-0.0004
a 
(3E-5)
 
-0.0004
a 
(6E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(5E-5)
 
-0.0003
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0001
a 
(4E-5) 
-0.0001
b 
(7E-5)
 
-0.0001
b 
(7E-5)
 
-0.0002
a 
(6E-5)
 
Adjusted  R-Square 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.84 
Sample  87 96  100  100  84 92 95 99 66 68 69 71 56 57 59 
 
a Significant at 1 per cent; 
b significant at 5 per cent; 
c significant at 10 per cent. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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   Table 4:  FDI and Corruption – Channels of Influence 
  I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI 
Culture 
      Power Distance 
 
0.040
a 
(0.009) 
 
0.035
a 
(0.010) 
 
0.036
a 
(0.011) 
 
0.026
b 
(0.012) 
       
      Individualism/Collectivism          0.000 
(0.009) 
0.005 
  (0.009)  
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
   
Education  
     Education in 70-1997 
  
-0.021
b 
(0.009) 
 
-0.024
b 
(0.010) 
 
-0.023
b 
(0.010) 
  
-0.0221
b 
(0.008 
 
-0.023
b 
(0.010) 
 
-0.024
b 
(0.010) 
 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
 
-0.021
c 
(0.010) 
 
0.021
c 
(0.010) 
FDI X Power Distance 
Interactions   
 
           
   FDI in 1970-1997 X  Power   
Distance 
-0.006
a 
(0.002) 
-0.006
a 
(0.001) 
-0.006
a 
(0.002) 
-0.004
b 
(0.001) 
       
FDI X 
Individualism/Collectivism 
Interaction     
     
 
          
    FDI in 70-1997 X 
Individualism/Collectivism 
 
    -0.014
a 
(0.003) 
-0.013
a 
(0.003) 
-0.015
a 
(0.003) 
-0.010
b 
(0.004) 
   
FDI X Education Interaction 
 
    FDI in 70-1997 X Education 
in70-1997 
 
        
 
-0.006
a 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.007
a 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.004
b 
(0.002) 
Political Tradition 
   Democracy 
 
  0.011 
(0.091) 
0.088 
(0.102) 
   -0.033 
(0.091) 
0.0311 
(0.094) 
 -0.066 
(0.085) 
0.040 
(0.099) 
   Political Constraint      -0.216 
(0.948) 
-0.175 
(0.970) 
   -0.483 
(0.979) 
-0.194 
(0.980) 
 -0.305 
(0.996) 
-0.128 
(1.005) 
Legal Environment 
    Rule of Law 
    
-0.195 
(0.119) 
    
-0.238
b 
(0.116) 
   
-0.238
c 
(0.121) 
    Legal Formalism        0.276 
(0.189) 
    0.325 
(0.213) 
   0.327 
(0.198) 
    GDP per Capita  -0.0003
a 
(4E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0002
a 
(7E-5) 
-0.0004
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(5E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(6E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(7E-4) 
-0.0003
a 
(3E-5) 
-0.0003
a 
(6E-5) 
-0.0002
a 
(7E-5)
 
Adjusted  R-Square  0.83 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.83 
Sample  48 48 42 42 48 48 42 42 99 42 42 
a Significant at 1 per cent; 
b significant at 5 per cent; 
c significant at 10 per cent. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.   28
 
Table 5: Robustness Tests 
 
  FDI as a dummy Variable  Instrumental Variables 
  I II  III  IV V 
 
VI VII  VIII 
FDI in 1970-1997   -0.535
b 
(0.182) 
    -1.221
a 
(0.342) 
   
Culture 
      Power Distance 
  
0.026
b 
(0.012) 
     
0.025
b 
(0.012) 
  
      Individualism/Collectivism      0.027
 b 
(0.013) 
     0.026
b 
(0.012) 
 
Education in 70-1997  -0.015
c 
(0.008) 
-0.014
 
(0.010) 
-0.022
b 
(0.010) 
-0.013
 
(0.011) 
-0.016
b 
(0.008) 
-0.017
 
(0.010) 
-0.023
b 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
FDIXPD Interaction   
 
            
   FDI in 1970-1997 X Power   
Distance 
 -0.011
b 
(0.004) 
     -0.013
 
(0.008) 
  
FDI X IC Interaction     
     
  
        
    FDI in 70-1997XIC      -0.010
b 
(0.004)
 
     -0.014
b 
(0.005) 
 
FDI X Education 
 
    FDI in 70-1997 X Education 
in 70-1997 
  
   
 
-0.007
b 
(0.003)
 
     
 
-0.010
b 
(0.004) 
Political Tradition 
   Democracy 
 
-0.058 
(0.072) 
 
0.066 
(0.099) 
 
0.041 
(0.093) 
 
0.068 
(0.093) 
 
0.023 
(0.071) 
 
0.161 
(0.100) 
 
0.107 
(0.093) 
 
0.121 
(0.091) 
   Political Constraint  0.533 
(0.775) 
0.386 
(0.939) 
0.121 
(0.956) 
0.112 
(0.980) 
0.266 
(0.735) 
0.030 
(0.994) 
-0.016 
(0.946) 
-0.047 
(0.969) 
Legal Environment 
    Rule of Law 
 
-0.256
a 
(0.088) 
 
-0.258
b 
(0.111) 
 
-0.273
b 
(0.112) 
 
-0.251
b 
(0.116) 
 
-0.237
a 
(0.086) 
 
-0.249
b 
(0.119) 
 
-0.270
b 
(0.110) 
 
-0.262
b 
(0.113) 
    Legal Formalism  0.316
b 
(0.133) 
0.307 
(0.174) 
0.458
b 
(0.185) 
0.362
c 
(0.182) 
0.382
a 
(0.129) 
0.429
b 
(0.174) 
0.564
a 
(0.176)
 
0.467
a 
(0.168) 
    GDP per Capita  -0.0002
a 
(6E-5) 
0.0002
a 
(7E-5) 
0.0003
a 
(7E-5) 
0.0002
a 
(7E-5) 
-0.00008
 
(6E-5) 
-0.0002
b 
(8E-5) 
-0.0002
a 
(7E-5) 
-0.0002
a 
(7E-5) 
Adjusted R-Square  0.85  0.84 0.85 0.84  0.85  0.83  0.84  0.83 
Sample  59 42  42  42  57  42 42 42 
 
a Significant at 1 per cent; 
b significant at 5 per cent; 
c significant at 10 per cent. The figures in parentheses are standard errors.   29
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: FDI and Change of Corruption 
 
  Corruption as a Change 
  I II  III  IV 
FDI in 1970-1997   -0.595
a 
(0.221) 
   
Culture 
      Power Distance 
  
0.064
b 
(0.024) 
  
      Individualism/Collectivism      0.051
 c 
(0.026) 
 
Education in 70-1997  -0.043
a 
(0.017) 
-0.047
b 
(0.019) 
-0.054
b 
(0.021) 
-0.040
 c 
(0.021) 
FDIXPD Interaction   
 
     
   FDI in 1970-1997 X Power   
Distance 
 -0.010
a 
(0.004) 
  
FDI X IC Interaction     
     
  
  
    FDI in 70-1997XIC      -0.020
b 
(0.0086)
 
 
FDI X Education 
 
    FDI in 70-1997 X Education 
in 70-1997 
  
   
 
-0.011
b 
(0.005)
 
Political Tradition 
   Democracy 
 
-0.090 
(0.152) 
 
0.174 
(0.198) 
 
0.025 
(0.186) 
 
0.034 
(0.193) 
   Political Constraint  0.714 
(1.709) 
-1.703 
(2.127) 
-1.115 
(2.121) 
-1.516 
(2.230) 
Legal Environment 
    Rule of Law 
 
-0.631
a 
(0.175) 
 
-0.401
c 
(0.231) 
 
-0.549
b 
(0.227) 
 
-0.485
b 
(0.237) 
    Legal Formalism  0.667
b 
(0.289) 
0.715
 c 
(0.387) 
0.906
c 
(0.481) 
0.733
c 
(0.409) 
    GDP per Capita  -0.0003
a 
(1E-4) 
0.0004
a 
(1E-4) 
0.0005
a 
(1E-4) 
0.0004
a 
(1E-4) 
Adjusted  R-Square  0.86  0.86 0.85 0.84 
Sample  54  40 40 40 
 
a Significant at 1 per cent; 
b significant at 5 per cent; 
c significant at 10 per cent. 
The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Appendix 1: Variables and Sources 
Variables Definition  Sources 
Dependent Variables: 
      
     Corruption 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
A measure of the corruption perception.  Corruption is defined as abuse of public 
office, and the corruption index measures the corruption perception based on 
survey of business people and analysts.  The measure is rescaled from the original 
by taking the difference from 10.  The values are averages over the period 2000 
through 2004 
 
 
Source: Transparency International 
(various issues) 
Independent Variable:  
 
     FDI to GDP ratio (%) in 70s, 80s, 90s and 1970-1997 
 
 
Foreign direct investment is inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown 
in the balance of payments. The values are decade averages over 1970s, 1980s, 
1990s and over the period 1970 through 1997. 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (1999) 
 
 
   Education  (in 70s, 80s, 90s, and 1970-1997) 
 
 
Gross secondary enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, 
to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of 
education shown.  It is measured as secondary school enrollment at a fraction of 
the age group eligible to the level of education. The values are decade averages 
over the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s and overall average over the period 1970 
through 1997. 
 
 
Source: World Bank (1999) 
 
 
 Culture 
 
      Power Distance 
 
 
 
     Individualism/Collectivism 
 
Hofstede’s cultural value that reflects the response of people to inequality.  It 
represents the extent to which the less powerful members of society accept, expect 
or prefer injustice. 
Hofstede’s cultural value that reflects the degree to which people in society are 
primarily concerned with their own self-interest over that of the collective. 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
 
 
 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
  Control Variables 
    
     Per capita GDP 
 
 
The logarithm of average per capita GDP   
 
 
Source: World Bank (1999) 
 
     Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Political Constraints 
 
A measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based on: (1) the 
competitiveness of political participation; (2) the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment; and (3) the constraints on the chief executive. The variable 
ranges from zero to ten, where higher values equal a higher degree of 
institutionalized democracy. This variable is calculated as the average from 1960 
through 2000, or for specific years as needed in the tables.  
 
A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making of 
political actors. The values are averages over 1970 through 2000 
 
Source:  Jaggers and Marshall 
(2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Henisz (2000) 
 
 
 
     Rule of Law 
     
 
 
     Legal Formalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
A measure of the prevalence of law and order and is based on the Political Risk 
Services Group’s International Country Guide (various issues), on a scale of 0 to 
10. 
 
The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial 
cases at lower-level civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following 
indices: (i) professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) legal 
justification, (iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, 
(vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) independent procedural actions. The index 
ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in 
the judicial process. 
 
Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
 
 
 
Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
 Instrumental Variables   
 
     Telephone Lines 
 
  
 
 
 
     Electricity Consumption 
 
 
Telephone lines are the total number of fixed lines and mobile phone subscribers 
(per 1,000 people). Fixed lines are telephone mainlines connecting a customer's 
equipment to the public switched telephone network. Mobile phone subscribers 
refer to users of portable telephones subscribing to an automatic public mobile 
telephone service using cellular technology that provides access to the public 
switched telephone network. The values are averages over 1970 through 1997. 
Electric power consumption measures the production of power plants and 
combined heat and power plants, less distribution losses, and own use by heat and 
power plants per capita. The value is average over 1970 through 1997. 
 
 
Source: World Bank (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (1999) 
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